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The Indigene and the Cybersurfer
J. Hillis Miller
L’inavouable de la communauté, c’est aussi une sou-
veraineté qui ne peut que se poser et s’imposer en si-
lence, dans le non-dit.
[The unavowable of the community, it is also a sover-
eignty which cannot help posing itself and imposing 
itself in silence, by way of the unsaid.] 
(Jacques Derrida, Voyous; my trans.)
In a call for papers for a special issue of ARIEL on “Globalization and 
Indigenous Cultures,” Fengzhen Wang and Shaobo Xie defi ne our pres-
ent world-wide situation in apocalyptic terms. We are, they say, experi-
encing the rapid destruction of indigenous cultures by three corrosive 
forces working together. These are global capitalism, Western (primar-
ily American) popular culture, and new communication technologies. 
New ubiquitous forms of telecommunication fuel the irresistible hege-
mony of capitalism and American popular culture. Technology, capi-
talism, and American popular culture cooperate to uproot and destroy 
every autochthonous culture around the whole world. “The processes of 
globalization,” say Wang and Xie, 
are irresistibly sucking every nation and community into their 
hegemonic orbit. . . . The desire of global capitalism challenges 
and undermines all traditional forms of human interaction and 
representation. Multinational capital with its hegemonic ide-
ology and technology seems to be globally erasing difference, 
imposing sameness and standardization on consciousness, feel-
ing, imagination, motivation, desire, and taste. In exchange for 
multinational capital investment and for access to American 
lifestyles, fashions, values, and conveniences glorifi ed and ro-
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manticized by Hollywood fi lms, the underdeveloped and pre-
modernized of the earth are unabashedly and unhesitantly sur-
rendering their landscapes, resources, traditions, and cultural 
heritages to cultural capitalism. (Wang and Xie 1) 
The image of the “hegemonic orbit” into which indigenous cultures 
are being “sucked” is particularly forceful. Western cultural capitalism 
is a kind of black hole into which everything around it swirls and then 
disappears, never again to be seen.
Since I want to challenge to some degree the paradigm so cogently 
expressed by Wang and Xie, let me begin by saying that I agree, for the 
most part, with the dismal picture they present of the destructive effects 
of global capitalism and Western popular culture. I would add to their 
picture the present terrifying mutation, in the United States govern-
ment, of global capitalism and the ideologies of Western popular cul-
ture into a straightforward push toward global military conquest. This 
means a transformation of United States civil society into a permanent 
“state of emergency,” a permanent “state of exception,” a permanent 
“state of war.” This goes along with a state of unrelieved and unreliev-
able terror that justifi es the suspension of civil liberties and of consti-
tutional rights. If the goal of the so-called terrorists is to strike terror 
into the hearts of American citizens, they have certainly succeeded in 
that, with the eager cooperation of the American government and the 
American mass media. Examples of the mediatic generation of terror are 
the endlessly repeated television shots of the Twin Towers falling down 
on 9/11 and the endless repetition of the phrases “the war or terror” and 
“weapons of mass destruction.” The threat to national security posed 
by the “terrorists” is used to justify repression at home, in the name 
of “homeland security.” It also justifi es aggression abroad, again in the 
name of “homeland security.” 
The slogan of imperialism used to be: “Trade follows the fl ag.” Often, 
in nineteenth-century Western imperialism, the missionaries were there 
fi rst, attempting to convert the “heathen savages” to Christianity. When 
the missionaries got in trouble, an occupying army had to be sent in to 
protect them. “Trade,” that is, economic exploitation, followed soon 
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after. Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is the classic, though problematic, 
representation in a Western fi ctional work of this historical process. 
Nowadays a better slogan would be “the fl ag follows trade,” with the 
supposed justifi cation of “making the world a safer place for democ-
racy,” that is, United States capitalism. Global capitalism invades fi rst. 
Military invasion follows to secure that. Total domination by capital can 
only be secured, in the end, by actual military occupation. An example 
is the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which “liberates” Iraqi oil for 
Western exploitation. The new and unprecedented American foreign 
policy of “pre-emptive strikes” can justify the bombing and invasion 
of more or less any country President Bush and his advisers defi ne as 
“evil-doers.” Who will be next? Iran? Saudi Arabia? Syria? North Korea? 
Libya? Defi ance of the United Nations and the refusal to sign important 
international agreements or treaties, for example the Kyoto Protocol on 
global warming or the agreement to set up an international court au-
thorized to try perpetrators of war crimes, means that the United States 
has become the chief rogue state. We operate in defi ance of interna-
tional law and global opinion. That is precisely the defi nition of a rogue 
state. (Derrida has written brilliantly about the political resonances of 
the word “rogue” in Voyous.) The United States is armed to the teeth 
with the “weapons of mass destruction” that we deny other countries the 
right to have. The Bush administration, so we are told, is quietly increas-
ing the United States nuclear arsenal. 
History shows, however, that empire-building eventually over-reaches 
itself and self-destructs, as happened with the Roman Empire and with 
the British Empire, on which it used to be said that the sun never sets. 
Gigantic budget defi cits in the United States are perhaps a presage of 
that ultimate collapse. Or perhaps the destruction of our environment 
and the inundation of our coastal cities by global warming will bring the 
end of the United States Empire. Or perhaps it will be massive deaths 
from an inadequately funded health-care system. Or perhaps the center 
of global capitalism will shift to other countries, to the European Union 
or to the People’s Republic of China. The latter, so I understand, will 
soon have the world’s largest economy. The largest number of websites 
by the year 2008 will probably be in Chinese, not in English. The end 
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of the United States Empire will take a while, however. Meanwhile we 
United States citizens, and the world, must endure much grief.
As you can see, I think things are even worse than Wang and Xie say. 
In this truly frightening situation, it is hard to keep one’s head or to 
think clearly. Nevertheless, I want to meditate a little further about the 
paradigm of global conquest by “cultural capitalism” that Wang and Xie 
describe, especially as it postulates the ongoing destruction of indig-
enous communities. The fi rst thing to note is that the discourse of the 
Wang/Xie statement is a Western cultural product through and through, 
as is this present essay. Both, by an apparently implacable necessity, per-
form the thing they deplore, that is the diffusion and hegemony of 
American cultural creations. “Hegemony” is part of the terminology of 
Western Marxist cultural studies, as in the work of Ernesto Laclau. The 
term “post-modernism” is associated with the work of Frederic Jameson. 
“Globalization,” as Jacques Derrida has cogently argued in recent semi-
nars, is a Western Christian concept through and through. That concept 
is dependent on the theological notion of “the world,” as used in the 
Bible or in St. Augustine. That connection explains why Derrida prefers 
the French word “mondialisation,” “worldifying,” to the English “glo-
balization.” “Mondialisation” more saliently brings out the theological 
roots of “globalization” as a concept. 
Wang and Xie’s paradigm, moreover, also depends on a problematic 
binary opposition between the indigene and what I am calling the cy-
bersurfer. Wang and Xie more or less take for granted that either sort 
of person coincides with his or her social and cultural placement, with 
little or nothing left over or left out. We are what our surrounding cul-
ture makes us. When global cultural invades any region, everybody there 
gradually becomes a cybersurfer, no longer an indigene. This assump-
tion that the individual is saturated by his or her cultural milieu is an 
important issue, to which I shall return. 
The cybersurfer is a quintessential victim of American values and 
technology. He or she is the “computer nerd” who will soon be found in 
every country all over “the world,” playing computer games that graphi-
cally display, and invite participation in, scenes of the utmost violence, 
listening to pirated MP3 songs by the hundreds that express the essence 
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of American popular culture, and communicating by way of email, cha-
trooms, or cellphone with other computer freaks all over the world. A 
cybersurfer is homeless, rootless, without privacy, exposed in all direc-
tions to invasions of his or her home enclosure by various technotele-
communication devices. Global cultural capitalism promises that every-
one can soon become a computer nerd. 
The indigene, however, is as much a Western concept as the cyber-
surfer is a product of Western cultural capitalism. The notion of the 
indigene is implicitly associated with the Enlightenment idea of the 
“noble savage,” and with the enthnographical search for what Maurice 
Blanchot, discussing Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques, calls “man 
at point zero” (Blanchot, “L’homme au point zero” 87-97; Blanchot, 
“Man at Point Zero” 73-82). The indigene lives unselfconsciously where 
he or she was born, as the etymology of the word avers. It means “born 
within.” On the island off the Maine coast where I live most of the year, 
the distinction is between those “from here,” and those “from away.” 
It takes three or four generations of one family born on the island and 
living out their lives there for the latest generation to become includ-
ed among those “from here.” The indigene is permanently “rooted in 
one dear particular place,” in W. B. Yeats’s phrase in “A Prayer for My 
Daughter” (Yeats 405). He or she remains in the state celebrated so 
nostalgically and so beautifully by Wallace Stevens in “The Auroras of 
Autumn.” The indigene was in a now-lost state of oneness with his or 
her milieu and with the others in the community, the “we.” Stevens calls 
it “a time of innocence”:
   . . . That we partake thereof,
Lie down like children, in this holiness,
As if, awake, we lay in the quiet of sleep,
As if the innocent mother sang in the dark
Of the room and on an accordion, half-heard,
Created the time and place in which we breathed . . . 
   IX
And of each other thought—in the idiom
Of the work, in the idiom of the innocent earth,
Not of the enigma of the guilty dream.
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We were as Danes in Denmark all day long
And knew each other well, hale-hearted landsmen,
For whom the outlandish was another day
Of the week, queerer than Sunday. We thought alike
And that made brothers of us in a home
In which we fed on being brothers, fed
And fattened as on a decorous honeycomb.
This drama that we live—We lay sticky with sleep. (Stevens 418-19)
All the salient features of the Western concept of the indigene or of 
what it is like to live in an undisturbed indigenous community are mov-
ingly chanted in this passage. Stevens is a United States poet who has 
expressed as well as any others of our great poets our sense of home-
land places, whether it is Hartford, Connecticut, where Stevens lived, or 
Pennsylvania Dutch country, where Stevens was born, or Florida, where 
he vacationed, or even Tennessee, as in “Anecdote of the Jar”: “I placed a 
jar in Tennessee . . .” (Stevens 76). One thinks of all the American place 
names in Stevens’s poetry, for example, the magical line, “The wood-
doves are singing along the Perkiomen,” in “Thinking of a Relation 
Between the Images of Metaphors,” or of “The Idea of Order at Key 
West,” or of a mention of the “thin men of Haddam,” in “Thirteen 
Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” or of the line “Damariscota da da 
doo,” in “Variations on a Summer Day” (Stevens 356, 128-30, 93, 235). 
“Perkiomen” is the name of a small river in Stevens’s native Pennsylvania, 
Haddam is the name of a town in Connecticut. Damariscota is the 
name of a coastal village in Maine. It is a Native American name. The 
list could be extended. Stevens’s early poem “Sunday Morning” (Stevens 
66-70) celebrates the particularities of the United States landscape as 
determining the life that is lived there. Many other Stevens poems make 
the same presupposition, as in the line in “The Comedian as the Letter 
C”: “The natives of the rain are rainy men” (Stevens 37).
Just what are those “salient features” of an indigenous community, 
according to Stevens? I say “indigenous community” because Stevens 
stresses that it is an experience shared by a “we”: “We were as Danes in 
Denmark all day long. . . .” This assumption that the indigene lives in a 
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community of other indigenes like himself or herself is one main feature 
of Stevens’s indigene ideology. To be an indigene is to be part of a col-
lectivity and to have collective experience. An indigenous community, 
moreover, is located in a place, a milieu, an environment, that is cut off 
from the outside world, the “outlandish,” the “queer,” one might almost 
say the uncanny, in the sense implied by the German word “unheim-
lich,” literally “unhomelike.” Indigenes are “hale-hearted landsmen.” 
They belong to the land, to its rocks, rivers, trees, soil, and ways of living 
on the land. That gives them healthy hearts. They would feel uprooted if 
they moved elsewhere. The indigene feels at home in his place, as Danes 
feel at home in Denmark, or as bees are at home in their honeycomb. 
To be an indigene is to be innocent, childlike. The indigenes’ inno-
cence is like that of Adam and Eve before the fall. They know not good 
and evil. They do not suffer the “enigma of the guilty dream” that tor-
ments fallen men and women, for example the terrifying Oedipal male 
dream of having killed one’s father and slept with one’s mother. Indigenes 
lack self-consciousness, as though they were sleepwalkers, or asleep while 
awake. They are “sticky with sleep.” “Sticky” here is associated with the 
decorous honeycomb on which the indigenes feed. Their at-home-ness 
makes their milieu a kind of sleep-inducing narcotic, as eating the honey 
they have collected puts bees to sleep, makes them “sticky with sleep.” 
Not only are the indigenes not aware of themselves, with the painful 
self-awareness and habit of guilty introspection that is supposed to char-
acterize Western man. The indigenes are also not aware of their environ-
ment in the sense of holding it at arm’s length and analyzing it. They 
take their milieu for granted as something that has always been there 
and always will be, eternally, as Denmark is for the Danes, according to 
Stevens. The wide-spread resistance to the evidence of global warming 
may be generated in part by this mythical assumption that our environ-
ment is unchangeable, endlessly renewable. Why does Stevens choose 
Danes as exemplary of an indigenous community? I suppose because 
they live in a small country, have a more or less homogeneous culture, 
and speak a “minority” language that cuts them off from others. That 
fi ts most people’s idea of an indigenous community, including the one 
presupposed in the Wang/Xie call for papers.
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To mention language leads me to note that language plays a crucial 
role in Stevens’s description. An indigenous community is created not 
just through shared ways of living, building, and farming on a particu-
lar homeland soil. It is also created out of language, by way of language, 
by way of a particular language that belongs to that place. One radical 
effect of the global hegemony of Western cultural capital is to endanger, 
if not extinguish, so-called “minority” languages everywhere. The in-
digenous peoples who inhabited the State of Maine where I live in the 
United States had dwelled here for as much as twelve thousand years 
before the white man came. By “here” I mean right here, within a mile 
or two of where I am writing this. On a nearby shore there is a large shell 
midden going back at least two thousand years, and a nearby dig off the 
island under twenty-fi ve feet of water found artifacts going back seven 
thousand years. We eradicated most of the indigenes and their culture 
in a couple of centuries. Only a few still speak the “native languages” of 
the Penobscots or the Micmacs. The goal of some of them now is to run 
gambling casinos, hardly consonant with maintaining their “native cul-
ture.” A dozen indigenous languages can disappear forever in California 
in a single year, as the last “native speaker” of each one of them dies. 
Thinking of the vanishing of indigenous languages makes the lan-
guage theme in Stevens’s lines all the more poignant. He sees an in-
digenous community as generated by language, in an act of maternal 
and artistic creation that mimes the creation of the world, as described 
in Genesis, out of the primordial darkness: “As if the innocent mother 
sang in the dark / Of the room and on an accordion, half-heard, / 
Created the time and place in which we breathed . . . / And of each 
other thought.” Why “on an accordion”? I suppose because it is a “folk 
instrument.” An accordion is suitable for creating the togetherness of a 
folk. Perhaps also it is because overtones of consonant togetherness in 
the word “accord” are buried in the word “accordion.” The members of 
an indigenous community are in accord. They are “of one accord.” In an 
assertion that recalls Heidegger’s argument in “Bauen Wohnen Denken 
[Building Dwelling Thinking]” and in his essays on Hölderlin’s poems,1 
Stevens says that the time and place of an indigenous community are 
not there to begin with and then occupied by the people. A native lan-
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guage creates the homeland that gives a people breathing room, a place 
to breathe, and therefore also a place in which they may use breath to 
speak to one another.
Stevens’s sentence cited above ends with the phrase “And of each other 
thought.” The language that creates the time and place of an indige-
nous community is also the medium in which the “natives” or “autoch-
thons” think of one another. Each indigene can penetrate the minds of 
his or her fellows because they all speak the same language, the same 
“idiom,” that is, a dialect peculiar to a specifi c group. It is the “idiom of 
the work,” that is, I take it, an idiom special to the work the innocent 
mother plays on the accordion. The reader may also hear an overtone of 
“work” as the collective creation of an indigenous community through 
language and through the physical transformation of the environment. 
This would be akin to the Marxist notion of work or to Heidegger’s 
notion of “Bauen,” building. 
The mother’s accordion work is also in “the idiom of an innocent 
earth.” The earth is innocent because it too has not yet fallen with Adam 
and Eve’s fall. The language spoken by indigenes is, as they are, born of 
the earth and remains rooted in it. Language, for Stevens here, is the em-
bodiment of thought. Each native knows what his or her fellow is think-
ing because, as we say, “they speak the same language.” The result is that 
“we knew each other well,” because, in Stevens’s sexist formulation, “we 
thought alike / And that made brothers of us in a home / In which we 
fed on being brothers.” I shall return to this exclusion of women in the 
invocation of “brotherhood,” blood brotherhood. 
This at-home-ness, fi nally, means that the place and the community 
dwelling within it are sacred. These happy autochthons “lie down like 
children in this holiness.” The creation of a community, through an idi-
omatic language and a collective living together, speaking together, and 
thinking together, creates a sacred place, makes the whole place sacred.
Wonderful! Hooray! Or, as Stevens puts this exuberance a few lines 
later in “The Auroras of Autumn”: “A happy people in a happy world— 
/ Buffo! A ball, an opera, a bar” (Stevens 420). Only two problems 
shadow this celebration. One is that the notion of an indigenous com-
munity is a myth, or, in Stevens’s terminology, an “idea.” One could 
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say that all Stevens’s work goes to demonstrate that this is the case. The 
homogeneous community of indigenes is always a matter of something 
that hypothetically once existed and no longer exists. “We were as Danes 
in Denmark,” but that is no longer the case. As Stevens puts this, a few 
lines earlier: 
There may always be a time of innocence.
There is never a place. Or if there is no time,
If it is not a thing of time, nor of place,
Existing in the idea of it, alone,
In the sense against calamity, it is not
Less real. (Stevens 418) 
An indigenous community is real enough, but it has the reality of 
something that exists only in the idea of it, before or after time, and 
outside of all place. 
The other menace that shadows this idea is that even the mythical 
innocent community was always darkened by the terror of invasion. It 
exists as “the sense against calamity,” but that calamity is always immi-
nent. The always about to happen calamity appears suddenly as a stark 
fear or terror just a few lines beyond the long passage I have been dis-
cussing: 
Shall we be found hanging in the trees next spring?
Of what disaster is this the imminence?
Bare limbs, bare trees and a wind as sharp as salt? (Stevens 419)
The poem, after all, is called “The Auroras of Autumn.” Its chief fi gure 
is terrifying autumnal displays of Aurora Borealis or northern lights, as 
they presage winter. Simply to name all the features of an indigenous 
community, even in a lyric poem so celebratory of the idea of it as is 
Stevens’s, is to destroy it by bringing it self-consciously into the light. To 
name it is to call up its specular image: the terror of its destruction. This 
obverse is generated out of its very security, as a sense of disaster’s immi-
nence. “A happy people in a happy world” sounds, and is, too good to 
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be true. To imagine having it is to be terrifi ed of losing it. The imagina-
tion of being at home, in a homeland or “Heimat,” instantly raises the 
fearful ghost of the “unheimlich,” the uncanny, the terrorist at the door, 
threshold, or frontier, or most likely already secretly resident somewhere 
inside the homeland. 
Jennifer Bajorek, in a brilliant unpublished essay entitled “The Offi ces 
of Homeland Security, or, Hölderlin’s Terrorism,” has shown the way 
the rhetoric of the Bush administration, in a sinister way, has echoed 
the mystifi ed appeal of Fascist states, for example the Nazi one, to the 
notion of a “homeland” mingling “Blut und Erd,” that is, racial purity 
and rootedness in one dear particular place. Our newly created “Offi ce 
of Homeland Security,” now renamed as the “Department of Homeland 
Security” and elevated to Cabinet rank, presupposes that we are a homo-
geneous homeland, an indigenous people whose security is endangered 
by terrorists from the outside, racially and ethnically strangers, who are 
probably also already inside, unheimlich presences within the home-
land. As Bajorek recalls, Bush said in a speech of September 20, 2001, 
“either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001). It is 
easy to see what is fraudulent about this use of the terms “homeland” 
and “security.” I do not deny the “terrorist threat.” Lots of people hate 
the United States. The twin towers were really destroyed. Nevertheless, 
the United States is not and never was a “homeland” in the sense the 
word implies. Relatively few United States citizens stay in the place they 
were born. We are nomads, even if we were born here. I was born in the 
state of Virginia, but my family left when I was a few months old, and I 
have never been resident there since. I have lived all over the place in the 
United States, as many of our citizens have. Huge numbers of our citi-
zens, moreover, are immigrants, many quite recent immigrants. Almost 
all of us are descended from immigrants who occupied an alien land. In 
my case, in part at least, my male ancestors were late eighteenth-century 
German unwilling immigrants, remnants of mercenary soldiers in the 
British army who were captured by the Americans, allowed to settle, 
and then became known as the “Pennsylvania Dutch.” Only the tiny 
number of Native Americans can truly call themselves indigenes. Of 
course their ancestors too were once newcomers, invaders from Asia of 
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an unpeopled land who crossed by the Bering land bridge just after the 
last ice age. The United States is made up of an enormous diversity of 
different races and ethnic groups speaking many different languages. 
The Department of Homeland Security in its surveillance activities 
has made many citizens or residents of the United States markedly less 
secure, certainly far less able to maintain the privacy of their homes, or 
of their email, or of information about the books they read, just as the 
invasion of Iraq in the name of national security has arguably made our 
“homeland” far less secure. It has done this by multiplying many times 
over the terrorist threat and by leading a country like North Korea to 
conclude that its only possible safety lies in developing deterrent nuclear 
weapons as fast as possible. To be “secure,” as Bajorek observes, means 
to be “without care,” and, as I have shown, the myth of the indigenous 
community generates the terror of losing it. It generates the insecurity it 
would protect us against.
Bajorek’s paper, in a subtle, balanced, and careful analysis, shows that 
the notions of homeland security and of an indigenous German com-
munity ascribed by Heidegger to Hölderlin is a mystifi ed misreading. 
Hölderlin rather, in his poems about rivers and valleys and mountains, 
for example in “Heimkunft / An die Verwandten [Homecoming / To 
the Related Ones],” read in admirable detail by Bajorek, presents the 
homeland as a place lacking ground, an “Abgrund.” It is a place of un-
healed fi ssures and unfathomable abysses, rather than as a place where 
an indigenous community in the sense I have identifi ed it, with Wallace 
Stevens’s help, could dwell. “[I]f for Hölderlin ‘home,’” says Bajorek, 
can only be a place to which one returns, and even to which 
one is always returning, this is not simply because the home 
that man makes on this earth is not a dwelling place, nor is it 
because it isn’t, in any rigorous sense, a place at all. It is because, 
for Hölderlin, being-there is always a being-elsewhere, and fi rst 
takes place by way of a departure. (Bajorek 24-5) 
I conclude at this point that the concept of indigenous communities, 
as invoked by Wang and Xie, is perhaps somewhat suspect. It depends 
on a Rousseauistic and perhaps to some degree Marxist myth of “man 
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at point zero.” It would be prudent to doubt such a thing ever existed 
in reality or exists in reality anywhere in the world today. I say “Marxist 
myth” because, as Blanchot shows in “Man at Point Zero,” Lévi-Strauss’s 
disappointed search for an ideal innocent indigenous community among 
the Nambikwara of South America was motivated in part by dubious 
Marxist millennial or utopian notions of post-capitalist communities of 
happy proletarians, at the end of history, enjoying their collective dicta-
torship, in a repetition of the happy savage communities at the begin-
ning of human history. 
Another Western notion of community, of much more recent origin, 
has been developed by twentieth-century theorists. Without denying 
the cogency of Wang and Xie’s argument for the truly deplorable ef-
fects of global cultural capitalism, I want now to identify that alternative 
notion of community and to think what it might mean for a possible 
resistance to the hegemony of global cultural capitalism. This notion of 
an “unworked” or “unavowable” or “secret” community, the “commu-
nity of those who have nothing in common,” is developed in the work 
of Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, Giorgio Agamben, Alphonso 
Lingis, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Nancy (see list of “Works Cited 
or Mentioned.”) Blanchot’s La communauté inavouable focuses on the 
investigation of community as it appears throughout Bataille’s work. 
Nancy makes references to Bataille that are essential to his argument. 
These six writers are by no means singing the same tune or preach-
ing the same doctrine, however. They do not make a community of 
the Same, as of Danes in Denmark, any more than American popu-
lar culture is a monolithic, monolingual, univocal ideology. The writ-
ers I have listed propose an alternative notion of community. This is 
the “community,” as Bataille puts it, in a sentence used by Blanchot 
as the epigraph for The Unavowable Community, “of those who do not 
have a community [La communauté de ceux qui n’ont pas de commu-
nauté]” (Blanchot, The Unavowable Community 1; Blanchot, La com-
munauté inavouable 9). The thinking of these theorists, however, is het-
erogeneous. They contest one another, however implicitly. Each of these 
six writers, moreover, is himself to some degree heterogeneous in what 
he says about community, as Blanchot makes a point of affi rming about 
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Bataille. An immense trajectory would be necessary to track the thought 
about community of all six. Oversimplifying radically, I shall focus most 
on Nancy’s La communauté désoeuvree (The Unworked Community), and 
on just one paragraph of that. (The English translation calls the book 
The Inoperative Community, but I prefer “Unworked,” because of its eco-
nomic or Marxist overtones, in spite of its being a neologism.) Nancy’s 
thought about community is subtle, complex, and not all that easy to 
grasp. I have space, however, to look closely at only one passage. 
Nancy sees persons not as individualities but as “singularities.” Persons 
are agents each fundamentally different from all the others. Each har-
bors a secret alterity that can by no means be communicated to any 
other singularity. These singularities are essentially marked by their fi ni-
tude or mortality. Each is from moment to moment, from the begin-
ning, defi ned by the fact that it will die. Here is Nancy’s expression of 
this, in a passage that is cited in part by Blanchot, in La communauté 
inavouable. Blanchot says it is the essential affi rmation in Nancy’s La 
communauté désoeuvrée: 
That which is not a subject opens up onto a community whose 
conception, in turn, exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of 
the subject. Community does not weave a superior, immortal, 
or transmortal life between subjects (no more than it is itself 
woven of the inferior bonds of a consubstantiality of blood or 
of an association of needs), but it is constitutively, to the extent 
that it is a matter of a “constitution” here, calibrated on [ordon-
née à] the death of those whom we call, perhaps wrongly, its 
“members” (inasmuch as it is not a question of an organism). 
But it does not make a work of this calibration. Community 
no more makes a work out of death than it is itself a work. 
The death upon which community is calibrated [s’ordonne] 
does not operate the dead being’s passage into some communal 
intimacy, nor does community, for its part, operate the trans-
fi guration of its dead into some substance or subject—be these 
homeland [patrie], native soil or blood, nation, a delivered or 
fulfi lled humanity, absolute phalanstery [phalanstère absolu: 
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the word “phalanstery” means “a community of the followers 
of Charles Fourier,” from phalanx (“any close-knit or compact 
body of people”) plus monastère, monastery.], family, or mysti-
cal body. Community is calibrated on death as on that of which 
it is precisely impossible to make a work (other than a work of 
death, as soon as one tries to make a work of it). Community 
occurs in order to acknowledge this impossibility, or more ex-
actly—for there is neither function nor fi nality here—the im-
possibility of making a work out of death is inscribed and ac-
knowledged as “community.”
 Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is 
always revealed to others. [La communauté est révélée dans 
la mort d’autrui: elle est ainsi toujours révélée à autrui.] 
Community is what takes place always through others and for 
others. It is not the space of the egos [des ‘moi ’]—subjects and 
substances that are at bottom immortal—but of the I’s [des je], 
who are always others [des autrui] (or else are nothing). If com-
munity is revealed in the death of others, it is because death 
itself is the true community of I’s that are not egos. It is not a 
communion that fuses the egos into an Ego or a higher We. It 
is the community of others. [C’est la communauté des autrui.] 
The genuine community of mortal beings, or death as com-
munity, establishes their impossible communion. Community 
therefore occupies a singular place: it assumes the impossi-
bility of its own immanence [l’impossibilité de sa proper im-
manence], the impossibility of a communitarian being in the 
form of a subject. In a certain sense community acknowledges 
and inscribes—this is its peculiar gesture—the impossibility 
of community. [La communauté assume et inscrit—c’est son 
geste et son tracé propres—en quelque sorte l’impossibilité de 
la communauté.] (Nancy, The Inoperative Community 14-15; 
Nancy, La communauté désoeuvrée 41-2).
The reader will see that Nancy’s model of community puts in question, 
point by point, all the features of Stevens’s model of an indigenous com-
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munity, the happy state of Danes in Denmark. Each person is a “singu-
larity,” that is, wholly other to all the others. Each singularity, in Nancy’s 
model of community, is not a self-enclosed subjectivity such as the other 
model assumes. Each singularity is exposed, at its limit, to a limitless or 
abyssal outside that it shares with the other singularities, from the begin-
ning, by way of their common mortality. Their community is defi ned by 
the ubiquity of death. This death we experience not in our own death, 
since that cannot be “experienced,” but in the death of another, the death 
of a friend, a neighbor, a relative. The passage culminates in the resound-
ing contradiction asserting that community inscribes, as what is most 
proper to it, most its own, the impossibility of community.
The language defi ning Nancy’s model of community is, necessar-
ily, fi gurative, catachrestic, since no literal language exists for it. Even 
conceptual words are used “anasemically,” that is, against the grain of 
their dictionary or normal semantic meanings. They are also used with 
an implicit or explicit play on their metaphorical roots. Examples of 
such words in Nancy’s book are “singularité” itself, or “désoeuvrée,” or 
“partagé,” or “com-parution,” or “limite,” or “exposition,” or “interrup-
tion,” or “littérature,” as in his phrase “literary communism.” Blanchot’s 
complex use of the word “désastre” in L’écriture du désastre (Blanchot, 
L’écriture du désastre 1995) is another example of this way with words. 
I give the words primarily in the original French, because their nuances 
are not easily translated. 
The fi rst model of community is easy to understand because it is the 
one most of “us” take for granted. Nancy’s model is more diffi cult to un-
derstand or to think. Moreover, one resists thinking it or taking it seri-
ously because it is devastating, a disaster, for the other model. Nancy’s 
systematic dismantling of that other model’s assumptions confi rms that. 
No subjectivities, no intersubjective communication, no social “bonds,” 
no collective consciousness, exist in Nancy’s “unworked community.” 
One word cognate with “community,” “communion,” leads to 
Christian communion and to Freud’s theories of the primal horde. Here 
a challenge to Nancy by Jacques Derrida will help me to refi ne further 
the two notions of community. Derrida’s target is not Nancy’s La com-
munauté désoeuvré but his L’experience de la liberté. In fairness to Nancy, 
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it must be said that what Derrida objects to in L’expérience de la liberté 
(1988) (trans. as The Experience of Freedom [1993]), that is, the empha-
sis on “brotherhood,” is lacking in La communauté désoeuvrée (1986). 
The members of a community, says Nancy in The Experience of Freedom, 
are in communion with one another by way of what they share. What 
they share is that they have killed the father and have shared, sheered 
out (partagé), his body and eaten it. This makes them “brothers,” “sem-
blables” (“mon frère, mon semblable,” says Bauldelaire in an apostrophe 
to his reader). They are the same. They share a guilt. They are all like 
one another. Hence they are transparent to one another, like the broth-
ers in Stevens’s poem. The French revolutionary motto, “liberty, equal-
ity, fraternity,” links freedom to fraternity. That freedom needed to be 
asserted in a violent act against monarchal sovereignty. The French revo-
lutionaries shared the guilt of killing the king. Modern English democ-
racy has the beheading of King Charles I on its conscience. 
A fraternal community is united in its opposition to those who are not 
semblables, who are different, who do not take communion, who do 
not act in the name of Christ’s words to his disciples at the Last Supper, 
a brotherhood if there ever was one: “This do in remembrance of me.” 
Such a community is a community of intolerance, often of unspeak-
able cruelty to those outside the community, as the Christians expelled 
Arabs and Jews from Spain. Such a community depends for its solidar-
ity on exclusion. You are either with us or against us. If you are against 
us you are “evil-doers,” as George W. Bush called Iraq, North Korea, 
Iran, etc., in the end every other nation but the United States, and then 
only a small group there, the rest being sympathizers, “focus groups,” 
peaceniks, communists, subversives, hidden terrorists, friends of terror-
ism, in short, evil-doers. This happens by an implacable and frightening 
suicidal logic that is built into democracy defi ned as a brotherhood of 
“semblables.” Ultimately only Bush and his cronies are left among the 
good people, and then they will start bumping one another off, as one or 
another of them “falls on his (or her) sword.” The latter phrase has been 
used recently to describe the way the head of the CIA, George Tenet, has 
taken responsibility for the lie in George W. Bush’s State of the Union 
address of 2003 about Iraq seeking uranium from Niger.
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Where by the way are the women in this paradigm, sisters, mothers, 
wives, lovers? Are they not non-semblables, unlike the men? Maurice 
Blanchot thinks so, as did Marguerite Duras. In “The Community of 
Lovers,” a chapter in The Unavowable Community, Blanchot proposes, 
on the basis of a reading of Duras’s récit, The Malady of Death, with 
reference to Levinas and to the story of Tristan and Isolde, another ver-
sion of the “unavowable community” he has delineated in the fi rst part 
of his book. This one is the impossible “community of two” made up 
of two lovers.
Derrida, in Voyous, is closer to Blanchot or to Nancy in La commu-
nauté désoeuvrée than to Nancy’s notion of a brotherhood of free men in 
The Experience of Freedom. Against Nancy, he poses a community of dis-
similars, non-semblables. This community is made up of neighbors who 
are defi ned by their absolute difference from on another: 
. . . l’éthique pure, s’il y en a, commence à la dignité respect-
able de l’autre comme l’absolu dissemblable, reconnu comme 
non reconaissable, voire comme méconnaissable, au-delà de 
tout savoir, de toute connaissance et de toute reconnaissance: 
loin d’être son commencement, le prochain comme semblable 
ou resssemblant nomme la fi n ou la ruine de l’éthique pure, s’il 
y en a. [. . . pure ethics, if there is such a thing, begins with the 
dignity of the other that commands respect as the dissimilar 
absolute, recognized as not recognizable, or rather as unrecog-
nizable, beyond all knowing, all knowledge, and all recogni-
tion: far from being its beginning, the neighbor as like or as 
resembling names the end or the ruin of pure ethics, if there is 
such a thing.] (Derrida 90; my trans.).
I end by asking: Suppose one were to take seriously Nancy’s notion of 
a community of singularities, or, in Lingis’s phrase, the community of 
those who have nothing in common? How would this lead one to think 
differently from Wang and Xie about the effects of globalization? The 
fi rst thing to say is that Nancy’s conception of community and the tra-
dition to which it belongs are as much Western inventions as any other 
product of cultural capitalism. Nancy’s community of singularities is 
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Western through and through. This is evidence that “Western ideol-
ogy” is not some monolithic thing. Nevertheless, Nancy’s concept of 
community is, like other such products, asserted with apodictic univer-
sality. It is not just Western men and women who are singularities, in 
Nancy’s formulations, but all men and women everywhere at all times. 
Nevertheless, Nancy’s ideas are a Western product, perhaps even a prod-
uct of the resources of the French language. I do not see any way out of 
this aporia. Any idea of community will be idiomatic, product of a given 
language. It will, however, tend to express itself as universal. Even so, it 
would be plausible to argue that each community should have its own 
singular idea of community, appropriate only for that community alone. 
That would raise questions about this essay, not to speak of Nancy’s uni-
versalizing. How can I speak except from within my own tradition?
The second thing to say is that if we take Nancy’s model of commu-
nity seriously, it disqualifi es, to some degree at least, Wang and Xie’s 
opposition between the happy indigene and the cybersurfer, the former 
at home in his or her particular culture, the latter penetrated through 
and through by global capitalism, corrupted by it, deprived of his or her 
specifi city and made the same as everyone else. You will remember how 
Wang and Xie put this: “Multinational capital with its hegemonic ideol-
ogy and technology seems to be globally erasing difference, imposing 
sameness and standardization on consciousness, feeling, imagination, 
motivation, desire, and taste.” According to Nancy’s model of commu-
nity, the singularity of neither indigene nor cybersurfer is touched either 
by the interpellations of indigenous culture, for the former, or by lev-
eling American popular culture, for the latter. Beneath their superfi -
cial cultural garments both indigene and cybersurfer remain singular, 
wholly other to one another, even though they may be living together 
as indigenes or communicating via email or AOL Instant Messenger 
as cybersurfers. To put this in Heidegger’s terms used in Sein und Zeit, 
the loneliness of Dasein, fundamentally characterized by its “Sein zum 
Tode (being towards death),” remains intact beneath the alienating su-
perfi cialities of Das Man, the “they” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit 235-267; 
Heidegger, Being and Time 279-311). It is now as true as ever that each 
man or woman dies his or her own death.
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Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that dwelling within the unique-
ness of a so-called indigenous culture, that is, a local way of living un-
touched by globalization, if such a thing remains, is a better way to live 
the otherness of singularities to one another than the global homogeniz-
ing culture that is rapidly becoming the most widely experienced way 
to be human today. Diversity of cultures, languages, idioms, I agree, is a 
good in itself, just as is a diversity of plant and animal species. Moreover, 
certain local cultures, it may be, are closer to recognizing the ubiquity of 
death in their religious and cultural expressions than is Western popular 
culture’s bland avoidance of death through its banal spectacular presen-
tation in cinema and television. Global capitalism has to be resisted by 
each local culture as best it can. One way, as Nancy suggests, is through 
what he calls “literary communism,” that is, literature, including philos-
ophy and critical theory, as well as poems, novels, cinema, and television 
shows, that confronts our solidarity in singularity, even though it cannot 
ever, he argues, be “confronted.” Blanchot’s “récits” might be taken as 
models of such literature. Alas, precious little of that is being written or 
produced for the new media today. 
Finally, I do not think much is gained by vilifying telecommunica-
tion technology as such. For one thing, these technologies are here to 
stay. Moreover, cinema, television, cell phones, and computers are rela-
tively neutral, in spite of the way their importation radically transforms 
any “indigenous” culture. The cultural force of these prosthetic devices, 
however, depends on the uses that are made of them. They can be used 
to reinforce and preserve local languages and local ways of life, how-
ever diffi cult it may be to do that. A recent essay in Scientifi c American, 
“Demystifying the Digital Divide” (Warschauer 42-7), distinguishes 
sharply between projects that simply set up computers in “underdevel-
oped countries,” in which case they are likely to be used primarily to 
play computer games, and those projects that use computer installations 
to help support and maintain a local culture. Warschauer’s prime exam-
ple is the Gyandoot (“purveyor of knowledge”) project in an impover-
ished region of India, Madhya Pradesh. This project circulates through 
an intranet information about crop prices, medical treatment, and so on 
that is intended to help maintain and improve the “indigenous culture,” 
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not destroy it, though one might still argue that the presence of comput-
ers is in itself the beginning of the end for that local culture.
The leveling effects of global cultural capitalism are enormously pow-
erful, but small-scale local ways can be found to resist those forces in the 
name of the idiomatic and the singular. Though Western critical theory 
and literature are concomitants of global cultural capitalism, they can be 
used to support resistance to globalization, just as the telecommunication 
products of capitalism can be mobilized against capitalism. It is a matter 
of deliberate choice, not necessarily a matter of passive submission to 
an inevitable Juggernaut. Or rather, the resistance to global capitalism 
is a matter of certain anomalous forms of speech acts performed within 
“indigenous communities,” now seen as gatherings of singularities. 
These speech acts perform local transformations of the global situation 
that might just possibly help maintain local communities of singulari-
ties. Somewhat paradoxically, another Western product, literature, may 
offer models for this. Examples are Wallace Stevens’s poems and those 
Victorian novels that often, in the end, assert the unknowable singular-
ity and solitude of their characters in the crucial decisions they make. 
Demonstrating that persuasively, however, would be another story.
Notes
 1 See Heidegger, Martin. “Heimkunft / An Die Verwandten”, “. . .  dichterisch 
 wohnet der Mensch . . .”, Vorträge und Aufsätze, “. . . Poetically Man 
Dwells . . . .”, and “Homecoming/To Kindred Ones.”
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